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THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT BY MISSOURI v. JENKINS
Laura S. Ffizgerald'
When I first read the Supreme Court's decision in
Missouri v. Jenkins,2 my immediate and visceral reaction
was that -the five-Justice majority had radically altered
- indeed, virtually amended - the equal protection
guarantee in the United States Constitution. This reac-
tion was not unique to me. For example, on the day
after Jenkins was handed down, the New YorkTimes ran
an editorial in response headlined 'A Sad Day for Racial
Justice."3 Denouncing the Jenkins majority as a "consti-
tutional wrecking crew," the editorial announced that
the "Supreme Court, a place where minorities once
looked for racial justice, did what it could yesterday to
halt the progress its own decisions once sparked."4 The
editorial excoriated the Jenkins majority as "justices [who
are] so eager to declare victory in the long struggle against
racism that they judge the remedies for racism as harshly
as racism itself"s The editorial concludes, "[the majority's]
definition of a 'color-blind' Constitution ignores the re-
ality that America is far from overcoming more than
two centuries of bigotry."6
But on reading Jenkins for the second time and more,
I began not to understand my initial reaction to it as a
radical amendment of equal protection under the United'
States Constitution. Why did this decision feel so monu-
mental? Why, indeed, has it, along with its Civil Rights
siblings from last Term, brought us all together today to
ponder whether "the Dream of the 1960s [has] Turned
Into the Nightmare of the 1990s?"
As an initial matter, the facts of Jenkins are so un-
usual, the magnet school program ordered by the fed-
eral court there so extravagant, so unusually expensive
- at a capital cost of over $1.5 billion, and yearly oper-
ating demands of $200 million or more - that the facts
themselves may make Jenkins a poor case on which to
puzzle over more abstract principles of constitutional
law. The district court in Kansas City admitted and, in-
deed, celebrated the fact that in formulating his detailed
orders establishing and funding the spectacular magnet
school program, he "allowed the [School] District plan-
ners to dream" and then "provided the mechanism for
those dreams to be realized."7 In fact, I have not come
I Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee Univer-
sity School of Law;. This essay is the text of the author's re-
marks during a panel discussion of Missouri v. Jenkins conducted
as part of a symposium entitled Civil Right: Has the Dream of
the 1960s Turned Into the Nightmare of the 1990s? held Febru-
ary 16, 1995, at Washington and Lee University.
1115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995)..
3 A Sad Day for Racial Justice, N.Y. TMS, June 13, 1995,
at A24.
4 Id.
across a single discussion of Jenkins's constitutional is-
sue - the boundaries of federal court desegregation
authority - (including Chief Justice Rehnquist's own
opinion) that does not emphasize the accumulating cost
of implementing the court's orders,8 or that does not
linger over decree details like the court-ordered 2,000
square foot planetarium, green houses and vivariums,
2 5-acre farm, and Model United Nations facilities wired
for language translation.9 The scope and extravagance of
these magnet school programs, as a matter of fact, may
undercut Jenkins's significance as a matter of constitu-
tional law.
Nonetheless, quite apart from its arguably unique
facts, Jenkins still suggests a major constitutional shift.
Yet this is not because of the majority's two specific le-
gal holdings in the case. That is, the legal rules that the
majority articulates and applies to decide the two nar-
row issues before the Court do not, I believe, wholly
explain the constitutional impact of the decision itself
It bears emphasizing how narrow those two legal issues
were. First, could the federal district court order the State
of Missouri to fund across-the-board salary increases for
teachers and staff in the Kansas City School District as
part of the ongoing desegregation program proceeding
under federal court order?' Second, could the district
court insist that the State of Missouri continue to fund
the quality education programs established under the
federal court order until Kansas City students began to
demonstrate consistent achievement levels at or above
national norms?"
In answering these two narrow questions, the ma-
jority articulates and applies legal rules that do not break
radically new constitutional ground. Let's consider the
second question first. The Court in Jenkins decided that
a State may be entitled to have its once-segregated school
districts pronounced constitutionally cured, and accord-
ingly released from further federal court control, even
though student achievement in once-segregated school
districts continues to fall below or not to exceed na-
tional averages. 2 This legal holding represents little more
than a straightforward application of two Court deci-
51d.
6Id.
7 Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2045.
8See, ag., N.Y. TMEs, June 13, 1995, at Al.
9Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2045; see also, The Supreme Court,
1994 Term - Leading Cases, 109 HAav. L. REv. 111, 240-41
(1995).
'0Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055.
"Id.
'2 Id. at 2055-56.
sions earlier this decade that establish the standards for
deciding when a once-segregated school system should
be deemed to have achieved "unitary" status - that is,
should be held to have accomplished compliance with
federal equal protection standards so that federal court
oversight under a desegregation decree must end, and
the decree itself be dissolved.13 These pre-Jenkins deci-
sions had already established that a school district's uni-
tary status - that is, its compliance with the Constitu-
tion - must be determined on the basis of two prag-
matic factors: first, whether the constitutional "violator"
(the segregating State or local government) had com-
plied in "good faith" with the desegregation decree all
along; second, an even more hard-nosed inquiry asks
whether the "vestiges of past discrimination have been
eliminated to the extentpracicabe."4 Thus, the Supreme
Court had already determined before it decided Jenkins
that a federal court could not extend the life of a deseg-
regation decree based solely, or even primarily, on the
school district's failure yet to achieve an ideal of quality
education, that is, a substantive ideal of education that
produces students who can compete and achieve at or
above national academic standards.' s So much for one
of Jenkins's radical holdings.
As for the other question presented,, whether the
district court could order the State to fund salary in-
creases for teachers and staff, the question is closer but
again it appears that the Jenkins majority breaks no radi-
cally new constitutional ground in holding that federal
courts exceed their equitable authority when they craft
desegregation remedies, like higher teacher salaries (and,
indeed, like Kansas City's entire magnet school program)
with the principal goal of enticing non-minority students
from other school districts voluntarily to seek an educa-
tion in the desegregating district.' 6That is, a federal dis-
trict court faced with the job of desegregating a school
district where people of color make up 68.3% of the
school-age population (as in Kansas City) cannot, after
Jenkins, attempt, through the court-ordered creation and
funding of dazzling magnet school programs, to engi-
neer a reverse white flight from other school districts,
like the Kansas City suburbs, in order to even out the
racial mix in the desegregating school district.'
7
To be sure, this holding in Jenkins requires a leap of
logic from the Court's 1974 decision in Milliken v. Bra-
dley (Milliken I),"s on which the Jenkins majority relied
almost exclusively in deciding this issue. 19 The Court in
'3Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Board of Educ. v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
14Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2050 (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503
U.S. 467 (1992), and Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237
(1991)).
'Particularly where, as here, the district court had never
made a factual finding measuring the incremental effect that
Missouri's past de jure racial segregation continues to have on
student achievement in the Kansas City schools. Id. at 2055.
16 d. at 2052, 2055.
Milliken I prohibited federal courts from remedying in-
tentional racial segregation in one school district by craft-
ing a desegregation decree that affected other school dis-
tricts as well unless those other school districts them-
selves had been adjudged guilty of racial segregation, for
example, by collaborating with the first school district
to ensure segregation across district lines. 20 Milliken I
recognized that interdistrict remedies might also be ap-
propriate where one district's intentional segregation had
caused "a significant segregative effect" to be felt across
those boundaries and into other districts.
21
As a practical matter, Milliken I prohibited federal
courts from desegregating a school district by entering
an interdistrict decree to bus white students from the
suburbs into predominately nonwhite urban schools, and
vice versa, if those other school districts had not them-
selves been adjudged guilty of intentional segregation
on the basis of race.
22
There is, of course, a logical synapse between this
ruling in Milliken I, concerned with federal courts im-
posing involuntary busing obligations on parents and
children residing in school districts not found to have
violated the equal protection clause, and the ruling in
Jenkins, concerned with a federal court attempting only
to create incentives to induce voluntary behavior by sub-
urban parents and children. Yet even though the Kansas
City decree sought, unlike Milliken I, to achieve an
interdistrict effect through voluntary action by subur-
ban parents and children, the Kansas City court none-
theless placed an involuntary obligation on the State it-
self to fund that interdistrict remedy. That was, after all,
the particular question presented to the Court by the
State of Missouri: whether the district court could or-
der it to fund pay raises to "improve the desegregative
attractiveness" of the Kansas City School District.23 From
this perspective, Jenkins looks more like Milliken I: both
cases deny federal courts the power to impose an invol-
untary obligation on a State or local government to fund
and otherwise comply with multidistrict segregation rem-
edies absent a finding of multidistrict segregation in vio-
lation of the equal protection guarantee.
So why then the powerful, the persistent reaction
that Jenkins represents a radical reformation of the
Constitution's equal protection guarantee?
The answer, or at least a working hypothesis, came
to me during President Clinton's State of the Union
Message this past January.24 This yearly event is no ordi-
17 Id. at 2050.
Is Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974)[herinafter
Milliken I].
19 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2048.
2 Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 746-47.
21 Id.
nId.
23 Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055-56.
24 President Bill Clinton, State of the Union Message (Jan.
23, 1996) reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1996, at A]3.
nary ritual of communication between the President and
the Congress; no mere practice or tradition honored for
honor's sake; no mere negotiated ceasefire between the
two federal political branches in a season otherwise re-
markable for its relentless, vicious partisan wrangling.
No. The Constitution itself requires the President "from
time to time, [to] give to the Congress Information of
the State of the Union, and to recommend to their Con-
sideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and
expedient."25
The Constitution requires this formal ritual of com-
munication, I believe, because it assumes that the Presi-
dent - in theory the chosen representative of the entire
nation - can perhaps offer a perspective on the com-
mon, national good; a perspective that may contribute
meaningfully to the Congress' effort to pursue the na-
tional good in its own legislative work. Indeed, that Ar-
ticle II imposes this specific communicative duty on the
President (a duty which Alexander Hamilton, interest-
ingly, referred to as a "powerj)26 reinforces the President's
constitutional role in the federal legislative process quite
apart from the President's qualified veto power.27 It re-
inforces the President's constitutional role in the pro-
cess in which we all decide as a national political com-
munity what our shared priorities and goals are or should
be.
Given these views about the Constitution's
policymaking role for the State of the Union message, I
was astonished to hear the President of the United States
propose, as a national policy priority, that public schools
be permitted to require students to wear school uni-
forms.
28
School uniforms. This was extraordinary. Here was
the President of the United States - appearing before
the full national legislature (not to mention the full Su-
preme Court) to carry out his Artide II communication
duty - and the President was elevating to the level of
national political debate the issue of what public school
children in Lexington, Virginia, or Houston, Texas, or
Miami, or New York, should wear to school every day.
This was nationalizing public school management, the
quality of public school education, to a breathtaking
degree.
By contrast to Missouri v. Jenkins.
My strong visceral reaction to Jenkins began to make
more sense. The majority's decision, I believe, is monu-
mental not primarily because of its legal holdings on the
technical legal questions presented. It is monumental,
in my view, because it suggests powerfully this majority's
2u.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 3.
26 THE FEDERAuST No. 77, at 519 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed.,1961).
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
2 N.Y.TiMES, Jan. 24,1996, atA13 (reproducing prepared
text of President's State of the Union Message delivered Jan.
23, 1996).
29347 U.S. 483 (1954).
inclination to delink issues of racial justice in this coun-
try from issues of public education in this country. The
Jenkins Court shows itself willing, even eager, to dis-
solve the tight constitutional link between public edu-
cation and the substantive ideal of racial equality em-
bodied in the Constitution's equal protection guaran-
tee, a link that has been recognized at least from the
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education29 until
June 12, 1995, when Jenkins was handed down.
In Brown, and in cases like Green v. New Kent County
School Board0 and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Education,31 one can discern an underlying commit-
ment by the Court to the principle that achieving racial
equality and racial justice in the Nation's public school
system was a necessary precondition to achieving that
racial equality, that racial justice, in the national com-
munity at large; just as the most dedicated segregation-
ists resisted public school desegregation as the key to full
social and civil desegregation. That is to say, in these
early desegregation cases, one can discern an undercur-
rent belief that the equal protection guarantee estab-
lishes - as a substantive constitutional norm - the prin-
ciple that racial justice in public education is necessary
to maximize every student's chance to achieve a flour-
ishing life within a national community undistorted by
racial division. That equal protection -and public educa-
tion are inextricably and substantively-linked.
In Brown, the Court expressly reE6gnized this sub-
stantive link between the Constitution's ideal of equal-
ity and public education, and not only in its famous ob-
servation, so roundly criticized by Justice Thomas in
Jenkins, that educating Black children only with other
Black children will "generat[e] a feeling of inferiority as
to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in ways unlikely everto be undone."3z
Indeed, quite apart from that famous observation, the
Brown Court recognized a tight substantive link between
the equal protection guarantee, public education, and
the goal of a thriving national community. The Court
observed:
Education is perhaps the most important func-
tion of state and local governments. ... [Public edu-
cation] is required in the performance of our most
basic public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citi-
zenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awak-
ening the child to cultural values, in preparing him
for later professional education, and in helping him
to adjust normally to his environment.3
30391 U.S. 430 (1968).
31402 U.S. 1 (1971).
32Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. SeeJenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2062,
2065 (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing Brown's reliance on
sociological or psychological effects of de jure school segrega-
tion on Black children).
3 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
It was in part because the Broum Court recognized this
tight link, between public education and the goal of a
just and flourishing national community, that the Court
concluded that school segregation implicated the
Constitution's equal protection guarantee at all.
Recognizing this unifying principle in Supreme
Court cases decided between Brown and Jenkins -
namely, that race and public education are inextricably
linked at the core of the Constitution's equal protection
guarantee - makes it possible to identify two aspects of
that constitutional jurisprudence that Jenkins eradicates.
First, Brown's approach meant that issues of race in public
education were deemed national. That is, so long as race
and education shared such a foundational place in the
interpreted ideal of racial equality guaranteed by the
federal Constitution, it made sense that issues of race
and education were decided by a federal decisionmaking
body on the basis of national, and nationally applicable,
standards derived principally from the Constitution.
While local influence over desegregation by States or by
school boards was never eliminated altogether by the
Court, the cases in the first two-and-a half decades after
Brown suggest that desegregation itself was deemed a
predominately federal issue. Accordingly, particularized
local concerns, including local autonomy for its own sake
appeared to carry little decisional weight.
Brown's tight linkage between race and public edu-
cation at the core of the federal equal protection ideal
had a second discernible consequence. Not only did it
make public school desegregation a federal issue, but it
squarely placed desegregation within the traditional prov-
ince of the federal court. So linked at the core of equal
protection doctrine, school desegregation controversies,
including remediation, immediately and naturally in-
yoked the judiciary's special role as the protector of the
individual's constitutional right to racial equality as
against an infringing political majority.A job tailor-made
for the nonmajoritarian, some say countermajoritarian
federal judiciary.34 A judicial job straight out ofMarbury35
and Carolene Products.3
6
But Jenkins offers a radically different view. No
longer is the goal of racial equality inextricably linked to
34 ALEXANDER BicKIL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANcH 16,
24-26 (1962). Bickel argued that the unelected federal judi-
ciary confronted a problem of legitimacy whenever it under-
took constitutional judicial review of the decisions of a
majoritarian legislature; he labeled this problem the
"countermajoritarian difficulty." Id. at 16. Bickel suggested that
federal courts could avoid this difficulty, and preserve the le-
gitimacy of their constitutional decisions, if they"served a func-
tion that was necessary to a democratic society, that no other
[majoritarian] institution could fill adequately, and that was
'peculiarly suited to the competencies of the courts.'" H.
JEFFERSON PowELL, THE MORAL TRADmON OF AMERICAN CON-
STrunONALISM 170 (1993) (summarizing Bickel's theory, and
quoting BiCKEL, supra, at 24). In Democracy and Ditrust, John
Hart Ely returned to Bickel's theory of judicial legitimacy, as-
public education at the core of the Constitution's equal
protection guarantee. Jenkins, indeed, can be read to stand
for the proposition that racial equality in public educa-
tion is no longer specially a federal equal protection is-
sue, for the majority directs federal trial courts to termi-
nate desegregation decrees based entirely on pragmatic
concerns about the "practicability" of additional deseg-
regating efforts, no matter how poor the education avail-
able to minority students left in a desegregating school
district like Kansas City's, and no matter how poorly
that education will serve any student in the effort to
achieve a flourishing life within a national community
unfrustrated by racial division.
Once race in education is demoted from its special
status at the core of the federal equal protection guaran-
tee, two consequences follow. First, demoting race in
education from its special status in Brown means that
public school desegregation is no longer a uniquely fed-
eral issue. Indeed, once race in education is demoted
from its special equal protection position, there is no
reason to invest in a federal institution the authority to
make decisions that will determine how race issues are
addressed - if at all - in a locality's public schools. So
school uniforms may now raise an issue more appropri-
ately national in scope, more appropriately to be resolved
by national political discourse, than issues of race and
education.
Second, demoting race in education from its special
equal protection status means that public school deseg-
regation is no longer an issue best decided by a
nonmajoritarian institution like a federal court. Instead,
issues of race in education are deemed best decided
through the ordinary operations of the majoritarian po-
litical process, just as the State or locality addresses other
concerns that demand the allocation of scarce commu-
nity resources. Thus, the Jenkins majority hints that, on
remand, the district court in Kansas City should divest
itself of whatever special federal constitutional author-
ity it has been invoking to federalize what are, to this
Supreme Court, simply local political questions about
how to allocate local resources.
serting that the appropriate special function of the
countermajoritarian courts was to protect the democratic pro-
cess from capture or abuse; thus, federal judges "are entitled
to overturn specific political outcomes if those outcomes stem
from a defect in the process, such as the systematic exclusion
of a racial minority from participation." Id. at 187 (summariz-
ing thesis of JOHN HART ELY, DaIOCRACY AND DISTRUST 105-34
(1980)).
35Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
36 United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938) (Stone, J.) (suggesting that judicial non-deference
to majoritarian decisions is appropriate either where those
decisions restrict the political process available for their repeal
or where they reflect "prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities" identified by religion, national origin, or race").
Read in this way, Jenkins becomes a case where
desegregation issues do not raise a question of the
Constitution's substantive commitment to an ideal of
racial equality. Instead desegregation issues raise a pure
and straightforward question of power: what kind of
decisionmaker, majoritarian or not, gets to make deci-
sions about race and education; and at what level of gov-
ernment should that power be lodged?
So why is Jenkins monumental? Because it may sig-
nal once and for all the Court's abandonment of what
since Brown had become a profound and familiar link
between public education and the ideal of racial justice
at the core of the federal equal protection guarantee.
Jenkins contradicts this assumption by delinking racial
justice from education and so the Court demotes race
and education issues from their status as a core federal
constitutional concern to the position of being a largely
local concern to be evaluated and addressed like any other
resource allocation problem for local majoritarian bod-
ies. Having the same constitutional status as zoning and
road construction; and, after President Clinton's State
of the Union Message, less national status than the issue
of public school uniforms.
To state this observation, this working hypothesis,
is not necessarily to declare that the constitutional alter-
ation that Jenkins reflects is itself bad or good; just or
unjust; accurate or not as an interpretation of federal
constitutional law, or civil rights more particularly. I wish
here simply to recognize that equal protection, race, and
public education appear profoundly alienated from each
other after Jenkins in a way, and to a degree, not pal-
pable before. This is Jenkins's constitutional amendment.
